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Eyewitness identifi cations are one of the main factors that jurors use to formulate their 
verdicts (Cutler & Penrod, 1995), and misidentifi cations at the trial stage can mean 
the difference between imprisonment and freedom (Scheck, Neufeld, & Dwyer, 2000; 
Wells et al., 1998). Much of the reason for juries’ erroneous convictions based on faulty 
eyewitness identifi cations is that jurors are not very sensitive to the factors that deter-
mine eyewitness accuracy. For example, Cutler, Penrod, and Dexter (1990) conduct-
ed a study of mock jurors’ sensitivity to issues in eyewitness identifi cation. The partici-
pants were presented with police descriptions of identifi cation conditions that included 
10 independent variables related to issues in eyewitness identifi cation. Some of these 
factors (e.g., weapon presence, retention interval) are known to have a signifi cant and 
often considerable impact on eyewitness accuracy, whereas others, such as eyewitness 
confi dence, are at best weakly predictive of accuracy (Cutler & Penrod, 1995). Of the 
10 factors, the only manipulation that affected participants’ verdicts was the level of 
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confi dence of the eyewitness. Other research has likewise shown that eyewitness con-
fi dence is the overriding determinant of the weight mock jurors give to eyewitness tes-
timony (e.g., Lindsay, Wells, & O’Connor, 1989; Wells, Ferguson, & Lindsay, 1981). 
Thus, mock jurors tend to be infl uenced by a variable that is only negligibly predictive 
of eyewitness performance, while being uninfl uenced by several variables that have a 
pronounced relation to eyewitness performance. 
Cutler et al. (1990) did not assess mock jurors’ sensitivity to the relationship 
between the eyewitness’s race and the defendant’s race. A common cause of mis-
identifi cations is the “own-race bias” or “cross-race effect” (CRE), which refers to 
the tendency for people of one race to be better at identifying members of their own 
race than members of another race (Brigham & Malpass, 1985; Chance & Gold-
stein, 1996). The CRE is quite robust (Anthony, Copper, & Mullen, 1992; Both-
well, Brigham, & Malpass, 1989; Meissner & Brigham, 2001; Shapiro & Penrod, 
1986; Sporer, 2001), occurs across various racial pairings (Meissner & Brigham, 
2001; Ng & Lindsay, 1994; Platz & Hosch, 1988), and is widely accepted among 
eyewitness experts (Kassin, Tubb, Hosch, & Memon, 2001).As the CRE is a reli-
able source of misidentifi cations, it is an important factor to address in the context 
of jury decisions based on eyewitness testimony. 
Although the CRE infl uences eyewitness accuracy, much of the general popu-
lation is unaware of it. For example, Kassin and Barndollar (1992), in a survey of 
laypersons’ beliefs about the effects of various factors on eyewitness performance, 
found that only 58% of participants agreed that a CRE would occur for White eye-
witnesses attempting to identify Black suspects (compared to 79% of the experts 
surveyed). This divergence between people’s common intuitions, on the one hand, 
and the state of the science, on the other hand, refl ects the often erroneous nature of 
potential jurors’ general beliefs about factors that do and do not infl uence eyewit-
ness memory (Brigham & Bothwell, 1983; Deffenbacher & Loftus, 1982; Yarmey 
& Jones, 1983). These beliefs, even if empirically unjustifi ed, can have signifi cant 
implications for jurors’ verdicts in eyewitness cases (Lindsay, 1994). 
Despite the abundance of research that addresses the effect of eyewitness’s 
race on measures of eyewitness performance (e.g., Meissner & Brigham, 2001), the 
effect of an eyewitness’s race on jury decisions has not been addressed. Only scant 
research has addressed the effect of any witness’s race (other than the defendant’s, 
who may of course testify as a witness). Memon and Shuman (1998) varied the race 
and gender of an expert witness at trial. The Black female expert witness was per-
ceived as being the most persuasive, showing that there was no own-race bias in the 
predominantly White sample (239 White vs. 37 Black mock jurors). With respect 
to participants’ own race, the Black mock jurors rated the expert witness—regard-
less of the witness’s race and gender—as less qualifi ed and less credible than did 
the White mock jurors (Memon & Shuman, 1998). If Black jurors are indeed more 
skeptical of all witnesses, this result could have important consequences at trial. 
Studies looking at the relationship between jurors’ race and their verdicts have 
found that Black jurors tend to be less likely to convict than White jurors, in both ac-
tual (Broeder, 1959; Simon, 1967) and mock criminal trials (Bernard, 1979), especial-
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ly when the defendant is Black (King, 1993; Skolnick & Shaw, 1997; Sommers & Ells-
worth, 2000; Ugwuegbu, 1979). Racial differences appear in civil trials as well, where 
Black mock jurors are more likely to reach a verdict for the plaintiff (Bornstein & Ra-
jki, 1994). This pattern seems to refl ect a belief among the majority of Black persons 
that the justice system (i.e., law enforcement and the courts) is discriminatory and bi-
ased (Brooks & Jeon-Slaughter, 2001; Hagan & Albonetti, 1982; Mann, 1993; Wort-
ley, 1996), leading them to side with persons whom they perceive as up against the 
system—namely, criminal defendants and civil plaintiffs. For example, Wortley (1996) 
reported that 76% of Black participants believed the police treated Blacks different-
ly from Whites, compared to 51% of White participants. Similarly, 60% of Blacks be-
lieved judges discriminated against Blacks, versus 38% of Whites. This pattern general-
ized to perceived discrimination against all minority groups, not just Blacks. 
In summary, the CRE is a phenomenon agreed upon by experts, but many prospec-
tive jurors are not aware of it or may misunderstand it. Previous research on potential 
jurors’ knowledge of the CRE has employed predominantly White samples (Brigham 
& Bothwell, 1983; Deffenbacher & Loftus, 1982; Kassin & Barndollar, 1992; Yarmey 
& Jones, 1983). Black individuals’ general distrust of the legal system (Hagan & Al-
bonetti, 1982; Wortley, 1996) may make them more sensitive to the infl uence of ra-
cial factors, such as the CRE, in legal contexts. Furthermore, even if jurors—Black or 
White—are aware of the CRE, they may not give it suffi cient weight in their verdict de-
termination. In addition, differences in verdict and witness perception exist between ju-
rors of different races. For these reasons, research is needed that varies the race of the 
eyewitness for mock jurors of different races, in order to assess mock jurors’ perception 
of the CRE and their use of it in reaching a verdict. 
The independent variables in the present experiment were the race of the eyewit-
ness (Black or White) and the race of the mock juror (Black or White); the race of the 
defendant was held constant.5 We predicted that there would be a main effect of mock 
jurors’ race on their verdicts. On the basis of previous research in which White mock ju-
rors treated Black defendants more harshly than did Black mock jurors (e.g., Skolnick 
& Shaw, 1997; Ugwuegbu, 1979), the White mock jurors in the present study were ex-
pected to render more guilty verdicts. With respect to the perceived credibility of the 
witnesses, there are two possibilities. On the one hand, if Memon and Shuman’s fi nd-
ings (Memon & Shuman, 1998) generalize from expert witnesses to any witness, then 
Black mock jurors would rate all witnesses as less credible than would White mock ju-
rors. On the other hand, if White mock jurors’ harsher treatment of Black defendants re-
fl ects a more positive attitude toward the criminal justice system among White indi-
viduals than among Black individuals, especially regarding the treatment of minorities 
(Brooks & Jeon-Slaughter, 2001; Hagan & Albonetti, 1982; Wortley, 1996), then White 
mock jurors would rate prosecution witnesses as more credible than Black mock jurors; 
but the opposite pattern would be true for defense witnesses. 
5 An ideal experimental manipulation would vary the defendant’s and even the victim’s race as well. 
We limited our study to manipulations of the participant’s and the eyewitness’s race because our focus is on 
the effect of eyewitness factors on jurors’ judgments, so these variables are most relevant to our primary re-
search question. 
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On the basis of the results of the Cutler et al. study in which mock jurors were 
insensitive to all factors that affect eyewitness testimony except for eyewitness con-
fi dence (Cutler et al., 1990) we did not expect a main effect of the race of the eye-
witness on mock jurors’ verdicts or credibility ratings. However, we did predict that 
mock jurors who were aware of the CRE would be affected more by the eyewitness’s 
race than those who were not. Finally, we made no predictions concerning interac-
tions between participant and eyewitness race for either the verdicts or the credibility 
ratings, based on a lack of research addressing both independent variables together. 
METHOD 
Participants and Design 
The participants were 145 undergraduates, 80 of whom were White and 65 of 
whom were Black. Participants were randomly assigned to the two eyewitness 
(Black–White) conditions, creating four groups of 31–42 participants apiece.6 
Materials 
An audiotape of a murder trial was played on a tape player. The 22-min trial consisted 
of normal courtroom proceedings: judge’s instructions, opening arguments, witness 
testimony (with direct and cross-examination), closing arguments, and jury instruc-
tions. The victim was killed following an argument at night outside a gym. The pros-
ecution called an eyewitness, who identifi ed the defendant in court as having commit-
ted the crime, and a police detective, who described how he found the gun used in the 
murder at the defendant’s house and how he conducted the lineup. The defense argued 
that the eyewitness lineup was biased and that the eyewitness was unreliable, because 
he observed the crime from 75 ft away, in poor lighting, and without his glasses. Fi-
nally, the defense called an alibi witness, who testifi ed that she saw the defendant at 
his house (where she was visiting the defendant’s roommate) both before and after 
the time at which the crime occurred; she believed that at the time of the murder, the 
6Most participants (all of the Whites, and roughly two-thirds of the Blacks) were recruited from psychol-
ogy courses (N = 125) and received extra course credit. To obtain roughly equal numbers of Black and White 
participants, 20 Black participants were also recruited from an African-American studies course (cf. Skolnick & 
Shaw, 1997). Because of logistical constraints, all of these participants were run in the White eyewitness condi-
tion. To test for any effects of this nonrandom sampling procedure, one-way ANOVAs on the principal depen-
dent variables were performed that included the following fi ve groups: White participants/White eyewitness, 
White participants/Black eyewitness, Black participants/Black eyewitness, Black psychology participants/White 
eyewitness, and Black African-American studies participants/White eyewitness. As predicted, the omnibus F-
tests were signifi cant, but Tukey post-hoc comparisons showed that the responses of the Black participants in 
the White eyewitness condition did not differ as a function of recruitment method (i.e., psychology vs. African-
American studies course), ps >.7. Planned comparisons involving just these two groups likewise showed no sig-
nifi cant differences: Verdict, χ2 = .68, p >.4, Φ = .15; Verdict-strength, F(1, 29) = 0.23, p >.6, η2 = .008; Eyewit-
ness Credibility, F(1, 29) = 1.37, p >.2, η2 = .045. The two groups of Black participants in the White eyewitness 
condition were therefore combined for purposes of analysis. 
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defendant was upstairs alone. The prosecution argued that the defendant could have 
snuck out of the house, committed the crime, which occurred only a couple of blocks 
away, and returned to the house, all without this witness’s knowledge. 
During the trial, a picture of each trial participant was projected on a screen. The 
trial was pretested to ensure that the evidence of guilt was even-handed and to select 
photos for the Black and White eyewitness. For the pretest, 30 participants listened to 
the audiotape of the trial without the slides—and thus without knowledge of any indi-
vidual’s race—and rendered a verdict. The verdicts were evenly split between guilty 
and not guilty. The pretest participants also rated the attractiveness of several pho-
tos of Black and White males, all approximately the same age, on an 11-point scale 
(extremely unattractive to extremely attractive). The two photos (one Black and one 
White, both rated as somewhat attractive) that received the most similar attractive-
ness ratings were selected for use in the trial as the eyewitness photos. 
Procedure 
Small groups of participants were tested at a time. Participants were instructed 
that they were acting as jurors in a criminal trial and that at the conclusion of the tri-
al they would render a verdict and answer a few questions about the trial. The exper-
imenter then started the audiotape of the trial and projected the picture of the defen-
dant onto the screen. When the tape reached the judge’s instructions, the arguments of 
the attorneys, or the testimony of the witnesses, the experimenter projected the cor-
responding photo of that individual onto the screen. The victim was never shown. At 
the conclusion of the trial, the experimenter projected the defendant’s picture onto the 
screen again and then turned off the projector. 
The fi rst response sheet requested a verdict of “guilty” or “not guilty,” as well as 
a rating of the participants’ confi dence in their verdict (1 = not confi dent to 5 = very 
confi dent). Participants next rated the following three items pertaining to each wit-
ness, on an 11-point (−5 to +5) scale: accuracy, credibility, and importance of the wit-
ness’s testimony. The last sheet had 10 questions that asked the participants to indi-
cate their beliefs about various aspects of eyewitness testimony. Embedded in the list 
was a question on the CRE: “A witness is (circle one) more likely/less likely/just as 
likely to correctly identify a member of his or her own race in a lineup than a mem-
ber of a different race.” The participants were also given a demographic questionnaire 
on which they indicated their gender, race, and whether they had previously served on 
a jury. Participants also indicated of what race they believed the victim to be (neither 
participants’ own race nor the eyewitness’s race affected their responses, ps >.05). 
RESULTS 
The three measures of witness credibility (accuracy, credibility, importance) were 
signifi cantly intercorrelated (all rs >.39, ps <.001) and were therefore summed to form 
an overall credibility index for each witness (αs >.77), which ranged from −15 to 15. 
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Verdicts 
Overall, 57 participants (39.3%) found the defendant guilty. A logistic regres-
sion was performed to analyze differences in verdict as a function of eyewitness and 
participant race. There was a signifi cant relationship between mock jurors’ race and 
their verdict (B = 1.43, Wald = 6.53, p = .01) with 51.2% of the White mock jurors 
rendering a guilty verdict, versus 27.7% of the Black mock jurors. There was no sig-
nifi cant relationship between the race of the eyewitness and participants’ verdict (B 
= .82, Wald = 2.01): 33.8% of those in the White eyewitness condition and 45.6% of 
those in the Black eyewitness condition rendered a guilty verdict. The interaction was 
not signifi cant, B = .92, Wald = 1.57. Comparable results were obtained when partic-
ipants’ verdicts and their confi dence in them were combined to create a continuous 
“verdict-strength” score (not reported here for the sake of brevity, but available from 
the corresponding author). 
Witness Credibility 
Mean ratings of the witnesses are shown in Table 1. There was a main effect 
of participants’ race on the credibility rating of the eyewitness, F(1, 140) = 13.50, p 
<.001, η2 = .088. The White participants rated the eyewitness as more credible, with 
a mean rating of 6.69 (SD = 6.13), than did the Black participants, whose mean rat-
ing was 3.16 (SD = 5.82). There was also a main effect of the race of the eyewit-
ness, F(1, 140) = 7.04, p <.01, η2 = .048, with the White eyewitness receiving a 
mean rating of 3.87 (SD = 6.52) and the Black eyewitness a mean rating of 6.27 
(SD = 5.76). Additionally, there was a signifi cant interaction, F(1, 141) = 4.56, p 
<.05, η2 = .032. The effect of the race of the eyewitness was greater for Black than 
for White participants (see Table 1, Column 1). Simple effect tests revealed that 
Black participants found the Black eyewitness to be more credible than the White 
eyewitness, t(1, 62) = 3.49, p <.01, but there was no effect of the race of the eye-
witness for White participants, t(1, 62) = .37. 
There was a similar pattern for credibility ratings of the other prosecution wit-
ness (see Table 1, Column 2). White participants rated the detective as somewhat 
more credible (M = 6.00, SD = 6.14) than did Black participants (M = 4.15, SD = 
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5.85), F(1, 141) = 3.42, p <.07, η2 = .024. There was also a main effect of the race of 
the eyewitness, F(1, 141) = 4.20, p <.05, η2 = .029, with those in the White eyewit-
ness condition rating the detective as less credible (M = 4.10, SD = 6.36) than those 
in the Black eyewitness condition (M = 6.14, SD = 5.64). There was not a signifi cant 
interaction, F(1, 141) <.01. 
There was an opposite pattern on the credibility rating of the alibi (defense) wit-
ness. The White participants rated the alibi witness as less credible (M = 6.36, SD = 
5.42) than the Black participants (M = 8.20, SD = 5.20), F(1, 141) = 4.31, p <.05, η2 = 
.03 (see Table 1, Column 3). There was not, however, a main effect of the race of the 
eyewitness, F(1, 141) = .33, nor was there a signifi cant interaction, F(1, 141) = .20. 
Cross-Race Belief 
The cross-race question embedded in the posttrial questionnaire asked wheth-
er participants believed witnesses were “more likely,” “less likely,” or “just as like-
ly” to identify members of their own race correctly than members of another race in 
a lineup. For the purpose of analysis, “more likely” responses were coded “correct,” 
and other responses were coded “incorrect.” Participants’ responses were regressed 
onto the variables of participant and eyewitness race. There was a signifi cant main ef-
fect of participant race, B = 1.39, Wald = 5.59, p <.05, due to a greater proportion of 
correct responses among Black participants (43.55%) than among White participants 
(28.75%). Neither the main effect of eyewitness race nor the interaction was statisti-
cally signifi cant, B <1.24, Walds <2.73, ps ≥  .1. 
To assess whether participants who were sensitive to the CRE were more like-
ly to be infl uenced by the eyewitness’s race than were participants who were insensi-
tive to the effect, participants’ cross-race belief, participant race, and eyewitness race 
were entered as independent variables in analyses of participants’ verdicts and rat-
ings of the eyewitness’s credibility. If participants factored knowledge about the CRE 
into their verdicts, one would expect that “accurate belief” participants would render 
more guilty verdicts in the Black eyewitness condition—where the eyewitness was 
the same race as the defendant—than in the White eyewitness condition. On the other 
hand, “inaccurate belief” participants should be unaffected by eyewitness race. Partic-
ipants’ cross-race belief had a signifi cant effect on neither measure nor did it interact 
signifi cantly with the other variables, ps > .1. Thus, participants who were aware of 
the CRE were no more likely to take it into account when evaluating eyewitness testi-
mony and reaching a verdict than participants who were unaware of the effect. 
DISCUSSION 
The hypothesis that White mock jurors would render more guilty verdicts than 
Black mock jurors was supported. This result is consistent with other studies in which 
Black mock jurors were more lenient than White mock jurors toward a Black defen-
dant being tried for a violent crime (Bernard, 1979; Johnson, 1985; Skolnick & Shaw, 
1997; Ugwuegbu, 1979). Because the present study did not also vary the race of the 
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defendant, we cannot know whether Black jurors would always be more lenient than 
White jurors, or merely favor defendants of their own race; prior research supports 
both possibilities (King, 1993; Sommers & Ellsworth, 2000, 2001). 
The hypothesis that there would be a main effect of participant race on the cred-
ibility of the eyewitness was also supported. The White participants found the eye-
witness to be more credible than did the Black participants. This result supports 
Memon and Shuman’s fi nding that Black mock jurors rated an expert witness as be-
ing less credible than did White mock jurors (Memon & Shuman, 1998). These re-
sults could imply that Black jurors are just more skeptical of witnesses in general; 
however, the Black mock jurors in the present study rated the alibi witness as more 
credible, while also rating another prosecution witness (the detective) as less credi-
ble, compared to the White mock jurors. 
This constellation of fi ndings suggests that Black individuals view defense wit-
nesses more favorably, but prosecution witnesses less favorably, than do White indi-
viduals. This explanation is supported by research showing that Black persons view 
the criminal justice system as more biased and discriminatory than do White persons, 
especially when, as in the present mock trial, the defendant is Black (Brooks & Jeon-
Slaughter, 2001; Hagan & Albonetti, 1982; Wortley, 1996). 
In the majority of cases, it is obviously desirable for jurors not to be infl uenced 
by an eyewitness’s race—unless it has implications for that witness’s reliability, as it 
does in the case of the CRE. In the present study, there was no effect of the race of 
the eyewitness on verdicts. This result is in line with previous research (e.g., Cutler et 
al., 1990; Lindsay, 1994) showing that mock jurors are generally insensitive to factors 
pertaining to eyewitness testimony other than eyewitness confi dence. However, there 
was a main effect of the race of the eyewitness on his perceived credibility. Partici-
pants rated the eyewitness as more credible in the Black eyewitness condition, sug-
gesting that perhaps they were aware of the CRE and, therefore, perceived the White 
eyewitness as less credible because of his race. One explanation for the failure of eye-
witness race to exert an effect on verdicts is that there was other strong incriminating 
evidence against the defendant, namely, the discovery of the gun at his home. Future 
research should manipulate the strength of the other evidence to determine whether 
eyewitness race would have a greater effect as it becomes more central to the case. 
It is also possible that the effect of eyewitness race on credibility would be miti-
gated by the deliberation process. Although some research suggests that group delib-
eration minimizes the effect of extralegal factors (e.g., Ellsworth, 1989), other studies 
have found comparable extralegal effects, both pre-and postdeliberation, for variables 
such as a plaintiff’s injury severity (Greene, Johns, & Bowman, 1999) and negative 
pretrial publicity (Steblay, Besirevic, Fulero, & Jimenez-Lorente, 1999). Thus, it is 
hard to predict whether deliberation would offset the effect of eyewitness race; future 
research should address this possibility. 
The main effect of an eyewitness’s race on his credibility was qualifi ed by an in-
teraction with participant race, such that only Black participants perceived eyewit-
nesses of different races as varying in credibility. Black participants were also more 
likely than White participants to demonstrate an explicit awareness of the CRE on the 
postexperimental questionnaire. However, participants who were explicitly aware of 
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the CRE were no more sensitive to variation in the race of the eyewitness than those 
who were unaware of the phenomenon. Furthermore, although Black participants dis-
criminated between eyewitnesses of different races in evaluating the eyewitness’s 
credibility, these differential credibility assessments did not translate into verdicts that 
differed as a function of eyewitness race (i.e., although Black participants were less 
likely than White participants to fi nd the defendant guilty in both eyewitness condi-
tions, their verdicts were the same whether the eyewitness was Black or White). This 
fi nding supports other research in which manipulations of the eyewitness’s credibility 
had no effect on mock jurors’ verdicts (e.g., Lindsay, 1994). 
Race is an explosive issue in the criminal justice system generally (e.g., Cole, 
1999; Fukurai, Butler, & Krooth, 1993; Mann, 1993), and the present fi ndings contin-
ue to support the notion that, indeed, “race matters.” For example, they suggest that 
Black criminal defendants should prefer to have Black jurors. Also, they suggest that 
the race of the eyewitness in relation to the defendant may have an effect on the ju-
rors’ perceptions of the eyewitness’s credibility, but this effect does not appear strong 
enough to infl uence their verdicts. The present fi ndings demonstrate that, as with oth-
er factors that can affect the fallibility of eyewitness testimony (Cutler et al., 1990), 
potential jurors are not sensitive to the CRE. 
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